Open Borders: Pegg’s Essay Questions

IUPUI‘s Scott Pegg assigned Open Borders this semester, and kindly gave me permission to post the following essay questions on the book.  Enjoy!

Please answer one of the following four questions. Because this is an open book, open time assignment, I expect to see some detail and specificity in your answers. References to Caplan and Weinersmith’s book Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration should be made whichever question you choose. Your answers should be somewhere in the vicinity of 3-5 pages double-spaced typed in Times New Roman 12 point font. Take as much time as you need to answer the question. This is not a timed exam.

1) Explain why Caplan and Weinersmith believe that “open borders has jaw-dropping potential to enrich migrants and natives alike” and “is a shortcut to global prosperity.” Upon what causal logic or what empirical findings do they base these claims? How does open borders compare in this regard to other potentially enriching policy changes like freer trade or greater global financial integration that we could pursue? Indicate whether you find Caplan and Weinersmith’s arguments that open borders potentially offers the prospect of “trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk” convincing or not.

2) In 2016, Americans elected Donald Trump as their president. One of his central campaign promises was to restrict immigration into the United States and build a wall to keep immigrants out. In 2020, President Trump faces a tough re-election battle but will likely carry the state of Indiana where we live easily. Given that, it’s probably not unreasonable to assume that give or take a majority of students in this class share views on immigration that are closer to President Trump’s than they are to the views expressed by Caplan and Weinersmith in Open Borders. Highlight which arguments put forward in Open Borders you most disagree with or find the most problematic and explain why. Make, develop, and support the best critique of the ideas put forward in this book that you can.

3) In attempting to make their case for a more open and less restrictive system of immigration, Caplan and Weinersmith consider several objections to open borders including immigrants threats to low-wage workers, freedom, our government’s fiscal position, our culture or way of life and even lowering our average national intelligence (IQ) score. Give specific examples of how Caplan and Weinersmith undermine these critiques or sources of opposition to their ideas or what they suggest as solutions to overcome these fears. Indicate which criticisms, if any, you think they effectively address and which criticisms, if any, are still strong or effective arguments against open borders.

4) Open Borders is premised upon the idea that “we live in a world of global apartheid. An apartheid based not on the race of your parents but on the nation of your parents.” Caplan and Weinersmith go on to argue that “It’s wrong to tell people where they can live or work because they are black… or women… or Jews. Why isn’t it equally wrong to tell people where they can live or work because they were born in Mexico, Haiti or India?” While these sentiments appeal to our better angels, they are completely unrealistic at a time when the US doesn’t even have open borders with Canada. Explain why Caplan and Weinersmith believe that “even if open borders never wins, the ideal can still serve as our moral compass.” What kind of progress can we or should we make short of fully opening borders?


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Yglesias’s Reasonably Strong Case for Way More Integration

As a long-time advocate of expanded immigration, I am delighted to have left/liberal Matthew Yglesias as an ally. Yglesias, who helped found online magazine Vox, is one of the rising stars in journalism and, especially, economic journalism. His latest book, One Billion Americans, advocates what the title says: we should change institutions so that we have 1 billion Americans. This book is particularly needed now. Yglesias’s major argument for more population, though, is not mine: he wants the United States to continue to be the world’s dominant power and worries that if we do not greatly expand our population, China will dominate.

In making this case, he advocates changing several government policies beyond immigration. In fact, he writes much more about those policy changes than he does about changing immigration policy. So, for example, we learn more about his proposals for government-funded childcare, housing, and transportation policy than we do about how many new people and what kinds of people he wants to let into the country each year. He does say he does not want open borders, but he does not say what immigration reform he wants instead.

On the non-immigration issues, he vacillates between intolerance of other people’s choices and great tolerance: he is intolerant of voluntary contracts between employers and employees that do not include paid parental leave, but he is highly tolerant of people’s decisions about what kinds of dwellings to live in. Where he is tolerant, he makes a good case. Where he is not, the book fails. Still, the big picture he paints is good: he shows that we can relatively easily triple the U.S. population without making our country too crowded or overly stressing most of our institutions.

These are the opening three paragraphs of David R. Henderson, “A Reasonably Strong Case for Way More Immigration,” my review of Matt Yglesias, One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger, 2020.

Another excerpt:

Yglesias points out that in 2018, the U.S. fertility rate fell to an all-time low of 1.72 births over the lifetime of the average woman. He argues, probably correctly, that an important factor causing women to have fewer children is the increasing cost of raising them. Whether the primary caretaker is a woman or a man, the persistent growth in real wages is raising the opportunity cost of rearing children. The law of demand rears its ugly head: when the price of something rises, then, all else equal, people buy less of it.

In a book that advocates massive increases in immigration, a natural next step to take would be to argue for reducing the cost of child rearing by allowing millions of immigrants, probably disproportionately women, into the United States from the poorest countries in Latin America, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the poorest countries in Africa, such as Zimbabwe and the Congo, and the poorest countries in Asia, such as India. It would not be hard to get 50 million immigrants from those places in a period of, say, five years. They would benefit and many current U.S. families would benefit from a dramatic fall in the cost of childcare.

But that is not where Yglesias goes. Instead, he advocates massive new government programs to subsidize the provision of childcare. He writes that “the United States has been shamefully slow compared with some peer countries to provide subsidized child care.” But the closest he comes to explaining why U.S. policy is shameful is to argue that because other countries are doing it, we should too.

Read the whole thing.



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Richwine on the Net Fiscal Effect of Low-Skilled Immigrants

In Open Borders, I heavily rely on the National Academy of Sciences report on The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Immigration to estimate the net fiscal effect of immigration.  Recently one of my graduate students pointed out this post by Jason Richwine criticizing my interpretation of the results.

Among dropouts, immigrants in the 25-64 and 65+ age categories are clearly fiscal burdens, as they cost taxpayers $225,000 and $257,000, respectively. Caplan, however, is tantalized by the age 0-24 column, which shows positive $35,000. “Even young high school dropouts more than pull their weight,” he concludes.

That conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of the table. Among immigrants in the age 25-64 and 65-plus columns, the education rows refer to the education of the immigrants themselves. However, in the age 0-24 column, education refers to the education of the immigrants’ parents. As p. 464 of the National Academies’ report explains, “If the immigrant arrives before age 25, we instead predict a future education level … based on parental education.” The reason the fiscal impact appears positive is that the model assumes that the children of high school dropouts will get more education than their parents did. In other words, most of Caplan’s “young high school dropouts” are not dropouts at all.

Richwine concludes in a gentlemanly manner:

This is an understandable mistake, as the National Academies authors should have been clearer that the age 0-24 column has a different interpretation than the other two age columns. Nevertheless, Caplan’s misinterpretation has led him far astray.

Did I indeed misread the report?  Yes.  Volume editor Francine Blau connected me with Gretchen Donehower, one of the authors of the section, and she confirmed my mistake.

Here’s the relevant NAS passage:

Because an individual’s tax payments and benefit receipts differ so much by the individual’s educational attainment, to predict future flows for an immigrant one must first predict the educational level that individual and his descendants will attain. An immigrant who arrives after age 25 is likely to maintain the education level observed on arrival, so we assume no change in educational attainment after age 25. If the immigrant arrives before age 25, we instead predict a future education level by estimating regression functions that predict offspring education based on parental education.

In hindsight, I was always a little puzzled by the NAS tables.  What does it mean, after all, to report the net fiscal impact of a 10-year-old college graduate?  I was also somewhat puzzled by how young immigrants could have such a favorable fiscal effect when taxpayers are immediately paying massive sums to educate so many of them.  But I deferred to the NAS numbers instead of double-checking the text.  I did read the whole chapter, but this qualification failed to register.  Mea culpa.

In light of Richwine’s correction, here is my revised position on the NAS report.

1. Young immigrants (ages 0-24) whose parents are high school dropouts have a positive net fiscal effect.

2. But the dropout parents themselves generally have a negative effect, even if they arrive as young adults.

3. Even 25-year-old immigrant high school dropouts have a negative net fiscal effect (-$186,000), though 25-year-old immigrant high school graduates have a positive net fiscal effect (+$72,000).


I continue to stand by several closely related controversial claims, most notably:

1. Immigrants have a much more favorable fiscal effects than matching natives.  The table showing that 25-year-old immigrant dropouts have a net fiscal effect of -$186,000 also shows that 25-year-old native dropouts have a net fiscal effect of -$388,000!

2. If you consider this an inadequate basis for restricting the reproduction of natives, it is hard to see why it is an adequate basis for restricting the migration of foreigners.


Last point: If there is a second-edition of Open Borders, I’ll definitely fix the mistake and thank Richwine for pointing out my error.


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Murray Rothbard on Humane Immigration Policy


I lift my lamp beside the golden door.


It all boils down to this: In all the talk about freedom to leave or to enter, are we really interested in freedom, justice, and humanity, or are we only interested in scoring Brownie points in the Cold War game? If the former, we should not merely be content to condemn Russia or Cuba for not letting their people go; we should hail any occasion when some of their people do go, and we should welcome all of them to our shores with good fellowship and open arms. If we truly wish to be the land of the free, we must return to the traditional American policy before World War I of welcoming immigrants, of lifting our lamp by the golden door. America was built by immigrants, and we lost a good deal of our soul when the lamp nearly went out after World War I and immigration was sharply restricted by a combination of racism and labor union restrictionism. Let us return to our own noble heritage and be the beacon-light of freedom once more.

This is from Murray Rothbard, “From Cuban to American Socialism,” Reason, December 1980. It was highlighted today on the Reason web site here.


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Reflections on One Billion Americans

Matt Yglesias’ new One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger is a delightful book.  But should you take my word for it?  Since I’ve published book-length defenses of both natalism and immigration deregulation, I’m obviously going to smile upon a book that reaches the same conclusions, right?

Truth be told, though, I often dislike books whose conclusions I endorse.  You can’t just be right; you have to be right for the right reasons.  By this demanding standard, One Billion Americans does well, though there is ample room for improvement.   Critical observations:

1. Matt relies heavily on the “national greatness” argument for population growth: The U.S. needs more citizens to remain the world’s dominant power.  While I grok the appeal of this argument, I am puzzled by Matt’s lack of enthusiasm for other pro-population premises.  Most notably: Life is well worth living, and it’s better if more people enjoy this opportunity.  And: Welcoming migrants from poor countries enriches humanity by moving talent from places where it produces little to places where it produces much.  More generally: The positive externalities of population are much larger than the negative externalities.  To be clear: Matt mentions all of these points, yet strangely only national greatness seems to animate him.

2. On further reflection, national greatness is one of the weakest and most dubious arguments for raising U.S. population.  Key question: What is the probability that fervently trying to hold China at number two ends up sparking World War III over the next fifty years?  Even if the chance is only 5%, why risk it?  Furthermore, if you’re eager to maintain American hegemony, advertising your intent is probably counter-productive; the prudent course is to cloak your geopolitical ambitions in universal and humanitarian garb.

3. Matt curiously neglects “brain drain” and related arguments against increasing immigration to the First World.  Should we really be trying to increase our national greatness at the expense of the greatness of all the other nations of the world?  Or just trying to increase our national greatness at the expense of China and other heinous dictatorships?  Or what?

4. Matt favors universal social programs to encourage fertility across-the-board, but only selective deregulation of immigration.  He explicitly opposes open borders: “We shouldn’t just recklessly throw the borders open to just anyone who happens to show up…”  This may be good politics, but it’s bad public policy.  Why?  Simply put: Welcoming immigrants is virtually a free lunch, but incentivizing fertility is very pricey.  So the wise course is to welcome immigrants of all skill levels, but target fertility incentives to where they’ll do the most good.

5. What fertility incentives do the most good?  Matt wants the government to lavishly fund virtually everything that makes having large families easier.  He doesn’t seem interested in research on comparative elasticities of different natalist programs.  Nor is he interested in demographics; whose fertility should we try hardest to encourage?

6. Given a finite budget for promoting fertility, however, the natural goal is to raise the fertility of people who are most statistically likely to enrich humanity.  This in turn requires us to defy Social Desirability Bias and admit that we can probably help the world a lot more by boosting elite fertility – the fertility of the rich, smart, well-educated, creative, and entrepreneurial.  I am well-aware that most people who talk this way are frightening misanthropes.  But I’m neither; you don’t have to be a superstar to live a meaningful and productive life.  My point, rather, is that encouraging fertility costs money – and you get more bang for your buck by targeting incentives at the would-be parents whose kids will contribute the most to the world.  (Caveat: It might cost more money to induce an elite couple to have an extra child, so it’s conceivable that you get more bang per buck by targeting sub-elites).

7. Matt barely discusses my favorite natalist policy: large non-refundable lump-sum tax credits.  By my calculations, these are the Holy Grail of tax policy: In the long-run, they more than fund themselves.  Key point: You only get the incentive insofar as you pay taxes in the first place.

8. Here’s the worst paragraph in One Billion Americans:

And over the long haul, universal programs probably do more to help the neediest than microtargeted ones do anyway.  The old saying about this is that “programs for the poor become poor programs” – programs that are easily subject to political attack – while universal programs garner stronger support.  The political science on this is not entirely unambiguous, but there is enough evidence on it to suggest that there ultimately isn’t a real trade-off between helping the poor and helping everyone.

Consider: Making programs universal easily multiplies their cost by a factor of five or ten.  Since even means-tested programs are expensive, Matt is talking about spending many trillions of extra dollars.  At minimum, you’d expect him to advocate ten million dollars of research to improve the quality of the “not entirely unambiguous” political science on this question.  If there’s a moderate chance we can painlessly save trillions of dollars, wouldn’t it be prudent to explore this possibility?

9. Matt’s cavalier support for universal programs is part of a much larger pattern: He favors massively more government spending on virtually everything.  Frankly, he’s a parody of a big-spender – even when he freely admits that government has an awful track record for waste.  Thus, after explaining that public transportation costs far more to build in the U.S. than in Europe, he still calls for bigger budgets:

The goal is to spend a little more and in exchange get a lot more – but still with plenty of jobs for everyone.  In France, they use a twelve-person crew on a tunnel-boring machine (TBM), while America uses twenty-five.  We don’t need to fire half the TBM operators; what we should do is hire 50 percent more but insist on building three times as many tunnels.

For Matt, apparently, spending 50% more is spending “a little more”!

10. Matt correctly explains that according to National Academy of Science estimates, the average immigrant to the U.S. is a net fiscal positive.  And he toys with the idea of imposing surtaxes on low-skilled immigrants to sweeten the calculation.  But if we followed even half of Matt’s spending advice, steep surtaxes would be required to prevent immigrants from becoming big net fiscal negatives.

11. If I were an environmentalist, I would be underwhelmed by Matt’s attempt to assuage my fears:

[W]e can’t just ask people to give up the fruits of prosperity.  Nor does it make sense to try to minimize the number of prosperous people.  What the world needs, climatewise, is to develop and deploy technologies that will make prosperous lifestyles sustainable.  If that can be done, the number of prosperous people is irrelevant.

Any alarmist worth his salt will object, “Let’s hope for the best but prepare for the worst.  Even if cheap, green technologies become available, dysfunctional policies could well prevent them from being deployed.  So let’s hedge our bets by continuing our efforts to restrain population growth – at least until Matt’s techno-topia arrives.”

12. Lest you get the wrong impression, Matt has excellent discussions of…

a. How absurdly low U.S. population density is, even ignoring Alaska and the Rockies.

b. The evils – and anti-natalist side effects – of helicopter parenting.

c. Deregulating childcare.

d. Mariel boatlift revisionism and anti-revisionism.

e. The JTWBDAAIOACDT argument (my label, not Matt’s).

f. How much of the damage of climate change ultimately stems from immigration restrictions.

g. The theory and practice of moving the federal government to the Midwest.

h. The ins and outs of housing deregulation

i. Peakload pricing.

j. America’s absurdly high infrastructure costs.

13. The only major category of spending that Matt wants to cut is defense.  A great choice – but hard to reconcile with his national greatness agenda.  If he were really serious about “standing up to China,” you’d expect him to copy-and-paste his position on tunnel-boring machines: Let’s have 50% more military – and do three times as much with it.

Overall, this is the best big-picture progressive policy book I can remember.  That said, One Billion Americans’ only stereotypically progressive feature is its commitment to profligacy.  Everything else should appeal to rationalists of across the spectrum.


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Three Economists Walk Into a Discussion, Part 2

Last week I posted Part 1 of my observations on the discussion between Kevin Hassett and Austan Goolsbee. This is Part 2.

I left with the issue of the federal deficit and debt.

35:30: Goolsbee doesn’t think we’ll be Greece. We have low income tax rates, no VAT, and better demographics.

He argues that tax rates on grandkids will need to he higher. He thinks we need immigration to offset the aging of the population.

DRH comment: I’m disappointed that neither Hassett nor Goolsbee discussed refinancing the debt to 10 to 30-year bonds, thus saving on a potential time bomb if interest rates rise by even 2 percentage points.

38:00: Goda says that the chance of kids today outearning their parents in the long run is less than for my generation outearning our parents.

39:00: Goda follows Goolsbee’s lead and turns to inequality.

39:45: Hassett talks about Trump’s opportunity zones and also notes Trump’s efforts on prison reform.

41:30: Hassett emphasizes that charter schools should not be curtailed.

42:00: Goda links the California fires and climate change. She doesn’t justify this.

42:30: Hassett emphasizes Trump’s “regulatory budget.” He also points out that Trump’s economists finally started including the deadweight loss from raising taxes to fund enforcement of regulation. (I think he confuses it by making a claim at first that even the cost of enforcing the regulations wasn’t included as a cost. That’s hard to believe.)

45:00: Goolsbee claims that Trump’s economists did cost/benefit analysis wrong. Hard to believe, but I don’t know.

47:30: Goda asks about trade.

48:00: Hassett points out that trade deals are thousands of lines and that he learned this from Goolsbee. Hassett says that trade deals were asymmetric in the past, with the U.S. conceding more than other countries. But this seems (to DRH) like a protectionist argument. “Conceding” to other countries presumably means dropping our tariffs and quota restrictions more than they drop theirs, so that our consumers gain more than their’s do.

50:30: Goolsbee says Trump’s approach is muscular declaration of trade wars with our allies: Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Germany, the EU, and Australia. And with China.

52:25: Goolsbee surprises me by saying that the USMCA is better than NAFTA. For my view see “NAFTA 0.0,” Defining Ideas, December 20, 2019.

53:00: The U.S. is putting agriculture on the welfare payroll.

53:30: Hassett goes back to the asymmetry point.

54:40: Goda asks them to share their data, based on input from listeners.

55:10: Goda asks question from the audience about immigration. What’s the appropriate policy?

56:00: Hassett says that when he was in the White House, Jared Kushner and others put together a reform that would make U.S. immigration policy like Australia’s.

56:45: Goolsbee’s best moment. Without robust immigration, we’ll have problems with safety net (presumably Social Security and Medicare) due to baby boomers. Points out how actively hostile Trump is to legal immigration also.

58:40: “This is not the American way.” I could hug Goolsbee.

59:00: Goda asks about Biden’s tax policies.

To be continued in Part 3.


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Guest Contribution: “International Factor Payments and the Pandemic”

Today we are fortunate to have as a guest contributor Joseph Joyce, Professor of Economics and M. Margaret Ball Professor of International Relations at Wellesley College. Trade in goods and services constitutes the most visible component of globalization. But there are also markets for labor and capital, the factors of production, as workers and firms seek […]

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The Supreme Court is a follower, not a leader

Both progressives and conservatives obsess about who is appointed to the Supreme Court, as if political ideology determines whether someone is a highly qualified judge. Or perhaps it is because they believe their preferred justices will produce a better set of public policies.  In fact, the hope of remaking the Court to fit one’s ideology remains a mirage, always hovering just over the horizon.  Here’s Janan Ganesh of the FT:

Whoever was “right”, the evidence that liberalism won continues to amass. Last week, the Supreme Court ruled to extend LGBT rights. It also frustrated President Donald Trump over the treatment of young undocumented migrants. And this is after the right’s Long March through the judiciary, masterminded by the Federalist Society and other campaign groups. Away from the recent cases, which dealt with statutes, the call for the strictest possible adherence to constitutional text has the romantic aura of all lost causes.

Ganesh’s essay is entitled “How conservatives lost the culture war”:

The failures do not end there. Take immigration. When conservatism hardened into a movement in the mid-20th century, 5 per cent of the US population was foreign-born. Now the level is near an all-time high at 14 per cent. Or take the status of gay people. Public opinion on same-sex marriage has flipped from two-to-one against to two-to-one in favour since the millennium.

President Trump recently put a hold on H1-b immigration, but given polling data (increasingly favoring immigration) I expect a surge in immigration in the future, perhaps as soon as 2021.  That’s partly because the pause in high-skilled immigration is like shooting ourselves in the foot, while “Making Canada Great Again“:

Mr Trump’s decision to extend a ban on permanent US residency applications and stop issuing other work permits such as H-1B visas has transformed Canada’s ability to compete for scarce talent, said technology and consulting executives who are among the biggest users of such visas.

“This may be a Canadian Jobs Creation Act. You can go to Toronto and hire people there and work quite effectively,” Cisco chief executive Chuck Robbins told the Financial Times this week. . . .

Rich Lesser, chief executive of Boston Consulting Group, told the FT that his firm had already offered jobs to several candidates who would be affected by the new H-1B and L1 visa rules. Instead of rescinding those offers, “by necessity we will move them to other countries, probably Canada”.

The US risked suffering “a migration of top talent” which would otherwise have been paying American taxes, he warned, dismissing the administration’s argument that the measures would speed the recovery of the US economy.

A CBRE study last year found that Toronto was North America’s fastest-growing market for tech jobs and its third largest after the San Francisco Bay Area and Seattle. . . .

“Interest has exploded,” said Irfhan Rawji, who founded a company called MobSquad 18 months ago to help American start-ups place tech workers rejected by the US immigration process in Canada.

Note that Toronto was already booming before the recent US moves to limit immigration.


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AEA Hides Its Racist Past


I posted on Thursday about the fact that the officers and governance committees of the American Economic Association don’t know much about the literature on the economics and discrimination. In their statement, they wrote:

We recognize that we have only begun to understand racism and its impact on our profession and our discipline.

I had thought at the time that they were simply ignorant of the literature. But it may be worse.

Commenter Richard Ebeling pointed out something I had missed: the AEA’s statement linked to literature on the “History of race and racism.” Take a look. Some of the items are excellent. The Richard Rothstein book, The Color of Law, is an example. I reviewed it positively here. Also, they recommend the movie Just Mercy, which my wife and I saw last month, and which is excellent. But the fact that they came up with a list would suggest that they did some kind of search. Where is the mention of work by Gary Becker or Thomas Sowell? Or how about work by Kenneth Arrow or Thomas Schelling?

And, most important, given that the list is presented by the AEA, where is the literature on Richard Ely, one of the founders, and the first secretary, of the American Economic Association, and a renowned racist? It’s not as if he hasn’t been studied. Princeton University economist Thomas C. Leonard wrote an excellent book, Illiberal Reformers, in which he documents the views of Ely and other Progressives. Ely called blacks people who “are for the most part grownup children, and should be treated as such.”

The straightforward way to deal with the AEA’s racist past would be to acknowledge it. There’s lots to choose from. How about, for example, the time (1888) when the AEA “offered a prize for the best essay on the evils of unrestricted immigration?” (The quote is from Leonard’s book on p. 143.) A lot of the anti-immigrant sentiment at the time, Leonard notes, was based on race.

Or how about Ely’s hostility to Chinese immigrants? He wrote:

[T]he fullest unfolding of our national faculties requires the exclusion of discordant elements—like, for example, the Chinese. (1894, “Thoughts on Immigration, No. I”) [quoted in Clifford F. This and Ryan Daza, “Richard T. Ely: The Confederate Flag of the AEA?Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 8, No. 2, May 2011, pp: 147-156.]

Or how about the fact that from 1962 to 2020, a prestigious lecture held every year at the annual AEA meetings was the Richard T. Ely lecture? To its credit, the AEA has suddenly deleted Ely’s name in the last few days. To its discredit, it says nothing about why.

Are we to believe that the AEA officers are ignorant of all this? One tell is that, as noted, they deleted the “Richard T. Ely” identifier from the annual lecture. Why do that suddenly if not for the fact that they do know something about the AEA’s racist past?

Of course, it’s possible that some of the AEA officers are ignorant. If so, I would recommend that they start with Thomas C. Leonard’s Illiberal Reformers. And if are unwilling to take the time to read it, at least they should put in on their own reading list.

Here’s Russ Roberts’ interview of Leonard.

Here’s Arnold Kling’s review of Leonard’s book.



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